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SECTION I: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE
1. Secularism and Conflicts about Rights
Chetan Bhatt 
Department of Sociology at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
During the period of the mass black, Asian and anti-
racist movements of the 1970s and 1980s, one of 
the common slogans that was used in a number 
of campaigns was ‘We are here because you were 
there’. That slogan is important because it said 
that migration in the 1960s and 1970s – against 
which there was a vicious mobilization by some 
mainstream politicians and neo-fascist movements 
alike – is part of an historical process. The histories 
of migrants did not begin in Britain but were shaped 
by British colonialism, plantation slavery, expansion 
and exploitation.
The demand that black and Asian people in the UK 
should be seen as part of an historical process is 
something that racism effectively denies. (Gilroy, 
2002). It is an important demand. It means that 
we have to address fully the histories – including 
the political histories – of people before they 
arrive in the UK or Europe.  These histories have 
many consequences that travel well beyond 
the characterization of people simply as victims 
of racism or producers of benign and colourful 
cultures, or people who only become significant 
when they need help.  
One consequence is that some progressive 
discussions about racism and migration can be 
very narrow, since these only look at the history 
of migrants once they have passed through 
immigration control at Heathrow or Stansted or 
Dover.  It is a paradox that progressive anti-racist 
discussions also reproduce a narrow kind of British 
nationalism that can be largely unconcerned with 
the world outside Britain, unless it can be related 
to Britain and its history of colonialism. Progressive 
anti-racism can also produce a kind of ‘racial’ 
victimhood that is outside history and politics. 
We need to also consider the way that racism has 
changed over the last two decades.  These new ideas 
around racism can challenge the understanding 
of racism that has been shaped by postcolonial 
migration since the end of the Second World War. 
When we talk about postcolonial migration, we are 
talking about processes that largely occurred up to 
more than half a century ago. In terms of patterns 
of movement and settlement, post-war migration 
was highly predictable and largely consistent.  One 
knew where a Kashmiri or Gujarati would come from. 
You knew not just the town, but probably also the 
village. You probably knew their sub-caste or sect 
and a range of other affiliations as well.  You could 
probably tell with some certainty where they were 
going to reside or settle in the UK.  
The human geography of movements of people 
across the globe today is very different.  It often 
occurs through the paths and enclaves that 
sanctuary seekers are forced to use or because of 
other varied movements of people.  The East African 
Asian migrants to the UK in 1968–74, for example, 
had already moved once and had made homes and 
families in another continent far away, well before 
coming to Britain. Many went on to have families 
dispersed across several continents. So we are not 
talking about the one-directional movement that is 
quite common in migration studies – for example 
from rural areas into the city and from the periphery 
to the metropolis. So we need to ask: Are terms 
such as migration and migrants always relevant? 
Do these terms adequately address the variety of 
movements of people today across the globe, often 
as a consequence of war and conflicts.
Equally important, for many sanctuary seekers, is the 
changed nature of militarism, humanitarism, war and 
conflict. We do not yet have adequate languages 
to grasp the variety of movements of people today 
across the globe, or the transformations of war and 
regional conflict since the late-1980s that have 
caused many of these movements.
Many dominant understandings of racism that have 
been shaped by the Asian, Caribbean and African 
experience may not necessarily be valid anymore, 
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or at least not valid in the way that is commonly 
thought.  Partly this is about being alive to new forms 
of racism and fascism that have very little historical 
relationship with the movements of the 1920s and 
1930s.  These are fascisms that don’t look at all like 
the fascism we are familiar with.  Yet they are often 
skilful philosophical projects whose loathing can be 
as intense as that of older fascism. 
If the lives and histories of migrants are considered 
as much more than the struggle against racism in 
the UK, and if their histories are considered in their 
fullness, in a way that a genuine antiracist approach 
has to, then other issues arise, like religion and faith. 
If we start talking about religion or about civil society, 
and about what makes a desirable civil society and 
what should be the place of religion within it, then 
this is inevitably where our disagreements start. We 
might begin to disagree about the relations between 
religion and the state and religion and public policy. 
We might begin to disagree about the role of religious 
organizations in progressive initiatives or as allies 
of progressive movements. I would be surprised 
if progressive people didn’t ‘appreciate and value 
diversity in a positive way’. But I expect that some 
of them might be wary of being asked to respect 
diversity independently of other considerations of 
equality, of women’s rights, and of human rights. 
We know the areas of disagreement well. For some, 
religions and faith organizations are seen as tools 
for ‘cohesion’ or manifestations of inalienable rights 
or the basis for legitimate political action.  But for 
others, they are deeply divisive.  When gender-
based discrimination or violence is considered, 
these disagreements multiply.  We have a clear 
division between secular universal human and 
women’s rights on the one hand and authoritarian 
versions of religious faiths on the other.  We also 
have an ethos of secularity that some may wish to 
see in civil societies and this is vigorously opposed 
by others in favour of a supposed cohesiveness that 
is brought about by religion.  These types of issues 
are typical in British debates.
Let’s take this outside Britain for a moment.  In 
Gujarat in 2002, there was a large-scale pogrom in 
which some 2000 Indian citizens, mostly Muslim, 
were killed and up to a quarter of a million people 
displaced from their homes.  The ensuing carnage, 
which is often called the Gujarat genocide, was 
undertaken by movements of the Hindu religious 
right.  Members of UK affiliates of those same 
Hindu religious right organizations have been 
involved in a variety of inter-faith initiatives in the UK, 
including at the highest levels of government. Those 
sympathetic to the Hindu Right and those who 
have defended the Hindu Right have been, among 
others, a government appointed commissioner on 
social cohesion (Gilligan, 2007).  The chief minister 
of Gujarat state, widely thought to have played a key 
role in the 2002 violence, is regularly invited to the 
UK – though secular south Asian political groups 
have frequently sought to prevent his arrival here.  
More broadly, the involvement of the religious right 
in policy areas is a common pattern, and it says 
something about the way the state in Britain relates 
to religion and culture.  It also demonstrates how 
minority groups in civil society are conceived in 
policy terms.  The state seeks ‘community leaders’ 
for minority groups (and creates them if they don’t 
already exist, especially with Asian populations).  For 
example, Lord the Goldsmith’s report on citizenship 
in 2007 (Goldsmith QC, 2007) listed as having 
been consulted – as you would expect – politicians, 
academics and policy experts, groups that are 
specialists in some way or another on citizenship 
and migration areas.  But the remainder were 
religious organizations and many were figures that 
were sympathetic to the religious right.  How does 
civil society become ‘substituted’ by a collection of 
religious groups, many of them claiming marginality 
and therefore demanding representation?  One can 
go very far in claiming that one is marginal, but what 
are the consequences of the religious rendering of 
civil society in these consultations?
I want to consider another example, from another 
vantage point.  In 1971, in what was East Pakistan 
and is now Bangladesh, there was a monumental 
genocide with estimates regularly putting the 
number of people killed at between 2–3 million and 
in the war that led to Bangladesh’s independence. 
It was a systematic genocide targeting intellectuals, 
communists, progressive journalists, feminists, 
lawyers and so forth.  Religious militia acting with 
the Pakistani army were directly involved in the 
genocide.  After Bangladesh’s independence, 
some members of the militia or members of the 
political party that spawned the militia could not 
stay in Bangladesh for obvious reasons.  Some of 
them came to the UK (along with numerous others 
who were refugees from the war and genocide itself) 
and later became involved in inter-faith and policy 
activities at the highest levels in the UK. Some were 
even implicated in war crimes and other atrocities. 
They are regularly opposed by secular Bangladeshi 
groups in the UK, all left-wing but who have no left-
wing allies to speak of since many on the UK Left 
are aligned with the same religious right party that 
was implicated in the genocide. Now for the Left in 
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South Asia, it is very clear what real dangers the 
movements of the religious right represent. These 
religious movements are not inexperienced, but 
have been in existence for some 60–80 years.  They 
are often massive and well-organized movements 
with a large number of wings – youth, women’s, 
education wings and so forth.  They are part of the 
histories of several of the countries of South Asia.  It 
is then a paradox that the Left in the UK works with 
the UK representatives of the same movements that 
are attacking Left groups in South Asia. 
Now I want to give a local example that illustrates 
other changes since the 1980s.  Some of you will 
remember the terrible racist murder of Altab Ali in 
Tower Hamlets in 1978 and the subsequent rise 
of Bengali youth movements.  Various conflicts 
occurred between the local community and the neo-
fascist National Front or the British movement.  In 
the 1980s and 1990s there were various campaigns 
and struggles concerning discrimination in housing 
and other public sector provision and the rise of 
several women’s organizations.  One of the key 
characteristics of the movements, groups and 
organizations, and the immense variety of cultural 
youth activities that emerged from that anti-racist 
period was that they were virtually universally 
secular in orientation.  In this period, let’s say, from 
the 1970s right through to the early 1990s, the term 
‘Asian’ was a secular term of common affiliation.  
There is a powerful history of secular Asian anti-racist 
and women’s struggles over almost the past 30 years 
or so.  These groups were important in facing down 
the real threat from organized fascism in the 1970s, 
as well as consolidating an independent political 
sphere that was well sustained right up to the 1990s. 
Such histories are written out of the discourses of 
multiculturalism and the faith agenda.  They are 
also erased by the Asian religious Right who wish 
to impose an altogether different understanding on 
those histories – histories that they played virtually 
no part in.  In this remarkably neglected history of 
secular Asian struggles in Britain, the ferocity of 
the racism that Asians faced and fought is at risk 
of being forgotten entirely by younger Hindus, 
Muslims and Sikhs.  For some of those people, 
the term ‘Asian’ evokes disgust. They are instead 
keener to celebrate the supremacy of their religions, 
monuments or civilizations.  We can mourn the loss 
of the memory of that history, or we can attempt to 
rescue it, but I doubt that there is a strong secular 
presence anymore that can challenge the ceaseless 
communalization of Asian politics in the UK.
Some people on the Asian religious right wish to 
replace this history with the politics of religious 
identity.  It is one of the peculiarities of this period 
that some young Hindus, for example, vehemently 
‘oppose colonialism’ by claiming to be the real 
Aryans, just as some young Muslims claim that a 
Crusader-Zionist-Hindu conspiracy governs the 
world.  Opposing racism and fascism can dovetail 
with other ideologies of communal purity. 
We often hear of the transformation of official 
anti-racist initiatives, which started in the 1980s 
after which they became something like an 
official multiculturalism and then, more recently, 
multifaithism.  At some point mutlifaith initiatives and 
other initiatives around social cohesion became 
linked.  After 2001, more insistently after 2005, these 
linked initiatives became unevenly associated with 
counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism. 
At a different, community level communal identity 
politics increasingly became the naturalized norm. 
The issue becomes not ‘How are we Asians going to 
live with each other?’, but instead ‘Who am I? How 
can I be purer in who I want to be?’ This becomes 
the register for thinking about anything to do with 
south Asians in the UK.  Why should this be so?  
Why indeed is the thinkability of Asians in this 
country inseparable from the view of them as 
target communities that need representation from 
unelected leaders?  Minority populations receive 
institutional recognition primarily as communal 
groups. This recognition takes a form that advances 
the undemocratically-derived political interests of 
those groups that wish to make communal claims. 
Those groups tend to be dominated by the political 
parties of the South Asian and middle-Eastern 
religious right. So what is the democratic deficit 
here?  Is this a kind of inferior citizenship?
Particularly after the 2001 disturbances in the 
Northern towns in the UK, some Hindu and Sikh 
groups demanded not to be addressed as ‘Asians’, 
and instead to be recognized as high achievers in 
employment and education, and as loyal, model 
minorities committed fully to Britishness. Here one 
can see how the rush to embrace British nationalism 
can link with ideas of communal purity.  In this same 
process, class divisions in Asian populations came 
to be articulated as religious divisions, with some 
successful Hindus and Sikhs claiming to be a world 
away from the Muslims they rubbed shoulders 
with daily:  the ‘good’ minorities against the ‘bad’, 
an absolute border created between the most 
proximate of peoples. 
These communal dynamics pose other issues 
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about relations between so-called migrant groups 
not just in Britain but across Europe.   For example, 
when and how will the second generation Turkish 
woman in Frankfurt be seen as a European by a 
second generation Indian woman from Leicester? 
Are both more at ease with seeing themselves as 
German or British rather than seeing each other as 
European? What might be the Europeanness that 
each might identify in the other?  Or are there other 
transnational dynamics, including religious ones, 
that will ultimately be more critical?
The rise and impact of the transnational religious 
Right can be a difficult area for the Left. Issues of 
security and citizenship, policing and militarism 
are being raised today in the context of sustained 
political demonization of Muslim populations.  We 
can recognize the difficulties that many progressives 
face in which, aside from the ‘global war on terror’ 
and the invasion of Iraq, there is an intense anti-
Muslim bigotry of a systematic kind across Europe. 
This bigotry has become linked to immigration 
and border controls in the most insidious of ways 
– for example, by enforcing gender and sexuality 
rights against members of religious groups coming 
to Europe. In Britain, the association between 
belonging and patriotism or between social 
cohesion and patriotism is particularly troubling. 
The political terrain is a peculiar one in many 
other ways, but one particularly powerful political 
configuration is between conservative tendencies 
and the supposedly liberal ones, both often 
proposing views that are pro-Israeli, anti-Palestinian, 
anti-Arab and anti-Muslim.  And we see the use of 
the languages of liberty and freedom, women’s 
and sexual emancipation directed against Muslim 
populations as a test of their acceptance of certain 
values. In concluding, our political choices are much 
wider than those offered by either the right-wing and 
libertarian anti-Muslim alliances on the one hand, or 
the different alliances of the Left with sections of the 
religious Right.
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